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BY BIRTH OR BY CHOICE?  THE INTERSECTION OF RACIAL 
AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 
Molly E. Swartz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By most measures, 12-year-old “M” was an observant Jewish boy.1  
Practicing in the Masorti tradition,2 M prayed in Hebrew, attended 
synagogue, and participated in a Jewish Youth Group.3  It was not 
surprising then, when M applied for admission to JFS (formerly the 
Jews’ Free School).  Founded in 1732, JFS is Europe’s largest Jewish 
secondary school and receives funding from the British government.4  
As such, it is extremely popular among Jewish children and generally 
considered to be an outstanding comprehensive school.5 
Nevertheless, M’s application was denied.6  Due to the popularity 
of the school, JFS gave preference to applicants who were recognized 
as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew 
Congregation of the Commonwealth (OCR).7  The OCR recognizes a 
person as Jewish only if:  1) that person was descended in the matrili-
neal line from a woman whom the OCR would recognize as Jewish; or 
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 1 Sarah Lyall, British Case Raises Issue of Identity for Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A8. 
 2 “Masorti” Judaism is referred to as “Conservative” Judaism in America.  See Masorti:  Jewish 
Tradition and Halachah, MASORTI FOUND., http://www.masorti.org (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010). 
 3 R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536 (Admin), [34] (Eng.). 
 4 JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536, at [119]; Sarah Lyall, British High Court Says Jewish School’s 
Ethnic-Based Admissions Policy Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A8 (explaining that 
JFS is “financed by the state”); JFS History, JFS, http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/node/65 (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2010).  
 5 JFS was rated “outstanding” on all thirty-nine measures by which the school was assessed 
by the British government in April 2009.  See OFFICE FOR STANDARDS IN EDUCATION, 
CHILDREN’S SERVICES AND SKILLS (OFSTED), INSPECTION REPORT:  JFS SCHOOL, REF. NO. 
133724 (2009), available at http://www.jfs.brent.sch.uk/sites/default/files/
pdfs/JFS%20Ofsted%20Report.pdf. 
 6 JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536, at [60]. 
 7 Id. [31]. 
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2) the applicant’s mother had undertaken a qualifying course of Or-
thodox conversion.8 
JFS’ Headteacher informed M’s parents: 
[B]ecause . . . [JFS] has not received evidence of [M]’s Jewish status it 
would not be possible to consider [M] for a place unless and until all 
those applicants whose Jewish status has been confirmed have been of-
fered places.  It follows from this that, as the School is likely to remain 
heavily oversubscribed, [M]’s position on the offer list will almost certain-
ly be very low and the likelihood of being able to offer a place is very 
small.9 
M was dedicated to and engaged in the Masorti Jewish communi-
ty, and his parents were practicing Jews.10  M’s father was a member of 
the Masorti New London Synagogue, and considered himself to be of 
Jewish ethnic origin, to be of the Jewish faith, and to be a practicing 
Jew.11  M’s mother was of Italian and Catholic origin, but she con-
verted to Judaism under the auspices of a rabbi at an independent 
Progressive synagogue.12  Many might consider M to be of Jewish her-
itage, but OCR did not.13  According to OCR and JFS, M’s mother’s 
conversion was invalid.  Consequently, OCR and JFS did not recog-
nize M as Jewish.14 
M and his family brought suit, alleging that JFS had discriminated 
on the basis of race.15  In mid-December 2009, the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom ruled in M’s favor.16  “[O]ne thing is clear about 
the matrilineal test,” wrote Lord Nicholas Phillips, president of the 
court, “it is a test of ethnic origin.  By definition, discrimination that 
is based upon that test is discrimination on racial grounds.”17 
As this case, officially known as R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS,18 illu-
strates, the line between religious categorization and racial discrimi-
nation is often blurred.  When are seemingly permissible religious 
distinctions actually prohibited racial discrimination?  In many cases, 
the answer may not be legally clear.  In America, a country with a 
unique history of both religiosity and racism, jurisprudence sur-
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. [60] (alterations in original). 
 10 Id. [34]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. [34]–[35]. 
 14 Id. [35]. 
 15 Id. [74]–[75]. 
 16 R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 17 Id. [45]. 
 18 [2009] UKSC 15 (appeal taken from Eng.); [2008] EWHC 1535/1536. 
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rounding racial and religious discrimination is well-developed.19  
Courts have recognized the fundamental importance of public edu-
cation,20 and disputes over race and religion in school admissions 
have become increasingly contentious. 
Public schools are generally prohibited from using race or reli-
gion in admissions policies, with a limited exception for benign racial 
classifications.21  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) prohi-
bits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national 
origin in public schools,22 subjecting public schools to strict judicial 
scrutiny whenever they use racial classifications in admissions poli-
cies.23  Benign racial discrimination in admissions policies, such as af-
firmative action programs, may be legally valid under certain circums-
tances.24  Thus, while public schools may never make admissions 
 
 19 For a discussion of racial discrimination, see, for example, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From 
Dred Scott to Barack Obama:  The Ebb and Flow of Race Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER 
L.J. 1, 1 (2009), noting the long, storied history of American race jurisprudence; Philip C. 
Aka, Affirmative Action and the Black Experience in America, 36 HUM. RTS. 8 (2009), detailing 
the legal history of race-based affirmative action in the United States; Derrick Darby, Edu-
cational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in Grutter:  A Lesson for the Reparations Debate in 
the Age of Obama, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 755, 756–57 (2009), describing racial discrimination 
in the educational context.  For a discussion of religious discrimination, see, for example, 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2005), assessing various laws 
intended to address religious discrimination; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Polit-
ical History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 280 (2001), describing the 
history and politics surrounding various interpretations of the Establishment Clause; 
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality:  The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 673–74 (2002), contending that the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Establishment Clause in such a way as to preserve political equality for and prevent 
discrimination against religious minorities. 
 20 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting that “educa-
tion is . . . the most important function of state and local governments” and the “principal 
instrument in awakening [a] child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment”). 
 21 Cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 
2060 (1996) (suggesting that the use of benign religious classifications in public school 
admissions decisions may also be a constitutional exception to federal anti-discrimination 
statutes). 
 22 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601, 606, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-4a(2) (2006). 
 23 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classi-
fications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); Regents of Un-
iv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort 
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”). 
 24 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has recognized two compelling state interests that 
may justify the use of racial classifications in the school context:  remedying the effects of 
past intentional discrimination and interest in diversity). 
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decisions on the basis of racial animus, they enjoy a limited right to 
engage in benign discrimination.25 
Title IV of the CRA also allows for the invalidation of a public 
school admissions decision based on religion.26  More than that, how-
ever, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents any 
public school from exercising religious preferences or creating reli-
gious restrictions.27 
Private schools, however, are not subject to the same anti-
discrimination laws.  As part of the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
free exercise of religion and freedom of association, religious institu-
tions remain free to discriminate on the basis of religion in admis-
sions.28  Despite this exemption, courts have applied some anti-
discrimination laws to private universities.  In particular, courts have 
prohibited private schools from engaging in race-based discrimina-
tion in admissions decisions.29 
This distinction between race and religion is complicated by the 
blurring of religious and racial lines, especially by “ethnoreligious” 
groups (i.e., groups identifying as both racial and religious groups).30  
 
 25 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (“[R]acial discrimination 
in public education is unconstitutional. . . . All provisions of federal, state, or local law re-
quiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle.”).  But see Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–22. 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a)(2) (2006). 
 27 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color or national 
origin at any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, but not prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of religion); see also Admissions, MARINERS CHRISTIAN SCH., 
http://www.marinerschristianschool.org/admissions/process.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010) (explaining that Mariners Christian School may screen applicants on the basis of 
religious preference and that “[a]t least one parent of each student must be a professing 
Christian”); Nondiscrimination Policy, ALMA HEIGHTS CHRISTIAN SCHS., 
http://almaheights.org/hs/admissions/nondiscrimination-policy/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2010) (reserving the right to screen applicants on the basis of religious preference); Of-
fice of Gen. Counsel, Non-Discrimination with Respect to Students, CATHOLIC U. AM., 
http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/Cr1964s.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (“An admissions 
preference on the basis of religion at a private university is not considered a violation of 
any federal law.”); School of Medicine Admissions, LOMA LINDA UNIV. SCH. OF MED., 
http://www.llu.edu/medicine/admissions.page (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (giving admis-
sions preference to members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church). 
 29 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (holding that a private school could not 
legally discriminate on the basis of race in admissions decisions); Bob Jones Univ. v. Unit-
ed States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the IRS may revoke a universi-
ty’s tax exemption because the university engages in racial discrimination). 
 30 See, e.g., Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation:  Are They Con-
stitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 170–71 (2005) (describing how peremptory chal-
lenges based on religion may in fact, allow for racial discrimination). 
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Should discrimination against or in favor of ethnoreligious groups be 
treated as racial or religious discrimination? 
Exhibiting both racial31 and religious32 characteristics, Jews are a 
paradigmatic ethnoreligious group.33  While Jews were commonly 
considered a race in nineteenth century America,34 Jews are no long-
er assumed to be part of a particular racial group.35  Determining who 
is a Jew remains a fraught question within the Jewish community,36 
making it even more difficult for courts to analyze discrimination 
against individuals identifying as Jews.  Despite the fact that Jews are 
not generally categorized as a distinct race, however, U.S. courts have 
allowed Jews to bring § 1981 and § 1982 civil rights actions, provisions 
that protect against racial discrimination.37  If discrimination against 
Jewish groups can constitute racial discrimination, may religious 
schools make admissions decisions based on Jewish applicants’ reli-
gious practice as an acceptable exercise of private schools’ religious 
exemption from anti-discrimination laws?  Or does this discrimina-
tion constitute impermissible racial discrimination as in JFS? 
In this Comment, I investigate the ways in which Jews’ ambiguous 
status pose unique problems for courts charged with evaluating pri-
vate schools’ compliance with anti-discrimination laws.  In Part II, I 
provide an overview of laws prohibiting racial discrimination in 
 
 31 See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Jews in Europe and Mideast Share Genes, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2010, at A14. 
 32 See, e.g., CENT. CONFERENCE OF AM. RABBIS, THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF REFORM JUDAISM:  
“THE COLUMBUS PLATFORM” (1937), available at http://ccarnet.org/Articles/ 
index.cfm?id=40&pge_id=1606 (“[W]e maintain that it is by its religion and for its reli-
gion that the Jewish People has lived.  The non-Jew who accepts our faith is welcomed as 
a full member of the Jewish community.”); Principles, AM. COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM, 
http://www.acjna.org/acjna/about_principles.aspx (“We view Judaism as a universal reli-
gious faith, rather than an ethnic or nationalist identity.”). 
 33 See generally J. Alan Winter, The Transformation of Community Integration among American Je-
wry:  Religion or Ethnoreligon?  A National Replication, 33 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 349, 349 
(1992) (concluding that American Jews identify as an ethnoreligious group). 
 34 See, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987) (noting that 
“[i]t is evident . . . that Jews . . . were among the peoples . . . considered to be distinct rac-
es” during the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 35 Id. at 617 (“Jews today [in 1987] are not thought to be members of a separate race . . . .”). 
 36 See generally Michael Selzer, Who are the Jews?  A Guide for the Perplexed Gentile—And Jew, 29 
PHYLON 231 (1968) (examining who is a Jew); Solomon Zeitlin, Who is a Jew?  A Halachic-
Historic Study, 49 JEWISH Q. REV. 241 (1959) (detailing the history of how Jews determined 
who was Jewish); Who is a Jew?  The Great Debate, JEWISH CHRON. ONLINE (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.thejc.com/judaism/judaism-features/20463/who-a-jew-the-great-debate 
(providing a roundtable discussion between prominent Jews as to who is a Jew). 
 37 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 612–13 (1987) (holding that § 1981 
protects members of groups that would have been considered races when the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act was passed); Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617–18 (holding that Jews 
may be considered a race for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982). 
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school admissions.  This includes a discussion of when race may be 
taken into account in public school admissions, i.e., affirmative action 
programs, and the applicability of race-based anti-discrimination laws 
to private schools.  Part III discusses the use of religion in admissions 
decisions.  In addition, I assess constitutional problems associated 
with providing government aid to religious private schools and in re-
stricting religious schools’ exercise of religious beliefs. 
Part IV focuses on racial/religious discrimination against Jews and 
how courts have analyzed anti-Semitism.  Despite conflicting opinions 
as to whether Judaism constitutes a race or a religion both in and out 
of the Jewish community, courts treat anti-Semitism as racial discrim-
ination.  In Part V, I examine the implications of providing Jews with 
race-based protections.  After evaluating the competing constitutional 
interests in dealing with anti-Semitism, I suggest a legal framework 
for analyzing discrimination against Jews. 
American courts have traditionally been reluctant to examine the 
character of discrimination against Jews.  By rejecting further inquiry, 
however, courts provide Jews with unparalleled protection against any 
form of discrimination.  The American legal system differentiates be-
tween racial and religious discrimination; when dealing with groups 
that exhibit both religious and racial characteristics, therefore, courts 
should examine carefully a school’s rationale behind its admissions 
choice.  Although it can be difficult to distinguish religious discrimi-
nation from racial discrimination in cases of anti-Semitism, I argue 
that—where feasible—courts must determine when discrimination is 
based upon racial characteristics and when it is based exclusively on 
tenets of religious belief.  This inquiry will ensure standardized 
treatment of victims of discrimination and safeguard religious 
schools’ ability to express religious preferences in admissions deci-
sions. 
PART II.  RACE-BASED SCHOOL ADMISSIONS DECISIONS 
The validity of the use of race in educational admissions has 
changed significantly in the past century.38  In both the public and 
 
 38 Compare Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that statutes providing 
for the separation of races in schools were constitutional) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368–69 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that race may be 
considered in admissions decisions) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954) (holding the segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race to 
be unconstitutional). 
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private school context, racial classifications in admissions policies are 
now subject to exacting judicial review. 
Recognizing the importance of education in breaking racial bar-
riers, courts have both provided for the desegregation of public 
schools39 and approved affirmative action programs in public institu-
tions.40  The Supreme Court’s understanding of the use of race in pri-
vate school admissions has also evolved.41  Though the state action 
doctrine limits the applicability of constitutional provisions to private 
actors,42 courts have held that private schools may not engage in hos-
tile race-based admissions decisions. 
A. Public Schools 
Discrimination on the basis of race in public school admissions is 
generally prohibited.  Title VI of the CRA prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of “race, color, or national origin” in federally assisted pro-
grams or activities, including public schools.43  Title IV of the same 
Act permits the Attorney General to initiate a civil action against any 
school board or public college that denies admission “by reason of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”44 
Yet courts did not recognize racial discrimination in schools as 
unconstitutional until the twentieth century.  The Supreme Court of-
ficially ended de jure segregation in public schools in Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown I) in 1954.45  Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that 
“it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. . . . [W]here 
the state has undertaken to provide [education], it is a right which 
 
 39 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 40 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of the 
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379 
(affirming the constitutionality of affirmative action programs). 
 41 Compare Guillory v. Adm’rs of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D. La. 1962) (de-
termining that a private university could discriminate on the basis of race in admissions 
decisions because the university was not a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) with Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1976) (finding that federal 
anti-discrimination laws prohibit private schools from making race-based admissions deci-
sions). 
 42 See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, On This Side of the Law and on That Side of the Law, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 755, 756 (2009) (“The state action doctrine . . . holds that the institutions 
of American government are bound by these constitutional provisions . . . but that private 
persons and companies generally are not.”). 
 43 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); see also Office of Gen. Counsel, 
supra note 28. 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006). 
 45  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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must be made available to all on equal terms.”46  Since then, schools 
have grappled with the legal mandate to end government-sponsored 
segregation.47 
To achieve racial equality in law, the Supreme Court employs the 
highest standard of judicial review—strict scrutiny—when govern-
mental actors subject individuals to unequal treatment based on 
race.48  Governments must justify racial classifications by showing a 
compelling state interest and demonstrating that the racial classifica-
tion has been narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.49  
The Court has held only two compelling interests to satisfy this stan-
dard:  remedying past discrimination and achieving diversity in high-
er education.50  Thus, racial classifications rarely survive judicial scru-
tiny. 
Courts have occasionally permitted state actors to engage in race-
based decision-making in affirmative action programs.  Because these 
programs may serve one of the aforementioned compelling interests, 
courts have determined that some race-conscious admissions pro-
grams are constitutional.  Even so, educational affirmative action 
programs must comply with certain criteria to pass constitutional 
muster.51  These standards differ depending on whether the program 
deals with pre-college or postsecondary education. 
1.  Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
Struggling to develop admissions programs that effectively en-
sured racial diversity, public universities began to adopt affirmative 
action programs in the 1970s.52  The Court, however, limited these ef-
forts at integration, restricting and refining the use of race in admis-
sions decisions in higher education in three foundational decisions:  
 
 46 Id. at 493. 
 47 Charles E. Dickinson, Note, Accepting Justice Kennedy’s Challenge:  Reviving Race-Conscious 
School Assignments in the Wake of Parents Involved, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1410, 1414 (2009) (de-
scribing school districts’ struggle to overcome segregation). 
 48 See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all 
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152–153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that “discrete and insular minorities” 
should receive heightened judicial scrutiny). 
 49 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) (explaining that racial classifications 
are subject to strict scrutiny and thus are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
to further compelling governmental interests). 
 50 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007). 
 51 See infra Section II.A.1–2. 
 52  Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 619 (1988) 
(discussing universities’ use of race-based admissions decisions in the 1970s).   
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Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003).   
a.  Regents of University of California v. Bakke 
In 1973 and 1974, Alan Bakke, a white male, was twice denied 
admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Da-
vis.53  To increase the number of minority students, Davis had insti-
tuted a special admissions program that set aside sixteen out of one 
hundred spots in every class for minority students.54  As a white male, 
however, Bakke was not considered for the special admissions pro-
gram.55  Bakke sued, claiming that Davis’s program violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56  The Court held 
that “attainment of a diverse student body” was a “constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”57  Yet Davis’ 
quota system had gone too far:  assigning a fixed number of places to 
minority students did not further the legitimate goal of diversity.58  In 
effect, the Court struck down the Davis program because it was not 
narrowly tailored to meet the goal of greater student body diversity.  
The six separate opinions in the case, however, meant that there was 
no majority holding regarding whether strict scrutiny or a lesser stan-
dard of judicial review would apply to future admissions programs.59  
As a result, schools and lower courts were left with no clear frame-
work for analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams.60 
b.  Grutter v. Bollinger 
In 2003, the Court again addressed race-based admissions deci-
sions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.61  Grutter assessed the 
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s admis-
 
 53 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1978). 
 54 Id. at 272–75. 
 55 Id. at 276. 
 56 Id. at 277. 
 57 Id. at 311–12 
 58 Id. at 315–16, 320. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Ellison S. Ward, Note, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs:  A 
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (2009) (describing confusion 
regarding the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in the wake of Bakke). 
 61 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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sions policy.62  The Law School evaluated each student based on a va-
riety of factors including grades, LSAT scores, and an essay, as well as 
“soft variables” including recommendations, the quality of the appli-
cant’s undergraduate institution, and racial and ethnic status.63  
When the Law School denied admission to Grutter, a white Michigan 
resident, she claimed that the school had discriminated against her 
on the basis of race.64 
Upholding the admissions policy, the court held explicitly that di-
versity was a compelling state interest.65  More than that, the Court 
explained that the Law School’s race-conscious admission program 
was narrowly tailored because it did not use a quota system, but ra-
ther considered race or ethnicity only as a “‘plus’ in a particular ap-
plicant’s file,” part of a “highly individualized, holistic review” of each 
applicant.66 
c.  Gratz v. Bollinger 
The Court applied that same analysis to the University of Michi-
gan’s undergraduate admissions program in Gratz.67  Michigan’s col-
lege admissions program used a points-based system.  An applicant 
received points based on high school grades, standardized test scores, 
geography and alumni relationships.68  In addition, the applicant au-
tomatically received an additional twenty points (of the 100 points 
needed to guarantee admission) if he or she was part of an underre-
presented racial or ethnic minority group.69  Two white Michigan res-
idents who were denied admission despite being within the qualified 
points range sued the University claiming racial discrimination.70  
While the Court reaffirmed that student body diversity was a compel-
ling state interest, it held that the University’s points system was not 
narrowly tailored enough.71  The University policy did not provide the 
“individualized consideration” of each applicant upheld in Bakke and 
Grutter.72  Instead, the automatic allotment of twenty points to minori-
 
 62 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311. 
 63 Id. at 315–16. 
 64 Id. at 316–17. 
 65 Id. at 325. 
 66 Id. at 334, 337. 
 67 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003). 
 68 Id. at 255. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 251. 
 71 Id. at 275. 
 72 Id. at 271. 
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ty applicants made “‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every 
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”73 
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz solidified diversity as a compelling interest 
for institutions of higher education.  The Court, however, continues 
to refine its understanding of what kind of admissions program is 
narrowly tailored enough to achieve this compelling interest.  While 
an individualized assessment of each applicant that takes race into 
account may be acceptable, an inflexible point-based system that 
awards applicants points because of race remains unconstitutional. 
2.  Affirmative Action in Elementary and Secondary Schools:  Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz left open the question whether elementa-
ry and secondary school admissions policies may take race into ac-
count.74  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1,75 however, the Supreme Court addressed this issue directly. 
Parents Involved challenged two school districts’ voluntary, race-
conscious student assignment policies.  The Seattle, WA school dis-
trict classified children as white or nonwhite when allocating slots in 
oversubscribed high schools.76  The Jefferson County, KY school dis-
trict classified children as black or “other” in order to make elemen-
tary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests.77  Both 
school districts used race only to ensure that a school’s racial balance 
mirrored that of the school district as a whole.78  Parents of students 
denied admission to certain schools brought suit, claiming that the 
school districts’ race-conscious school assignments violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.79 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. struck 
down the school district assignment programs,80 limiting Grutter’s ac-
ceptance of student body diversity as a compelling interest to higher 
education.81  While Justice Kennedy agreed with Roberts’ reading of 
 
 73 Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)). 
 74 Ward, supra note 60, at 628 (suggesting that Gratz and Grutter created uncertainty regard-
ing how to determine the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions programs in ele-
mentary and secondary schools). 
 75 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 76 Id. at 709–10. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 710–11. 
 80 Id. at 701. 
 81 Id. at 722–26.  At least one author has suggested that five of the justices actually agreed 
that diversity in primary and secondary education is a compelling state interest.  See Ni-
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Grutter, he noted in his concurring opinion that “[d]iversity, depend-
ing on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a 
school district may pursue.”82  In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by 
Justices Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens, argued that diversity should 
be a compelling interest in primary and secondary public education.83  
Thus, a majority of the Court seemed to support the idea that student 
body diversity is a compelling state interest in pre-college education.  
The plurality held that Grutter’s analysis of diversity as a compelling 
interest did not apply to K-12 schools but it did not decide that diver-
sity could never be a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-
based classification. 
The majority agreed, however, that the Seattle and Jefferson 
County programs were not narrowly tailored enough to achieve their 
stated ends.84  The minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifica-
tions on school enrollment suggested that racial classifications may 
not have been necessary.85  Roberts explained that narrow tailoring 
“requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives’”86 and that schools must employ a broader notion of di-
versity than white/nonwhite or black/“other” terms.87  Neither the 
Seattle school district nor the Jefferson County school district had 
considered alternatives or embraced a broader view of diversity.88 
While Gratz and Grutter provided some guidance as to when race-
based admissions programs may be permissible in higher education, 
Parents Involved only addressed an impermissible use of race-
conscious admissions in elementary and secondary schools.  It re-
mains to be seen whether any race-based classifications will survive 
strict scrutiny in elementary and secondary school admissions. 
B.  Race-Based Admissions Decisions in Private Schools 
Private schools’ admissions policies are not subject to the same 
constitutional constraints as public schools.  Because racial discrimi-
nation is uniquely contrary to constitutional mandates, Congress and 
 
cole Love, Note, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1:  
The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Race-Conscious Student Assignment Policies in K-12 Public 
Schools, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 115, 131 n.142 (2009). 
 82 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 83 Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 84 Id. at 733 (majority opinion). 
 85 Id. at 734. 
 86 Id. at 735 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). 
 87 Id. at 723. 
 88 Id. at 735. 
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the courts have found other avenues to attack racially-discriminatory 
admissions policies in private schools.  Using civil rights laws89 and tax 
statutes, courts have allowed private rights of action against race-
based admissions decisions at private schools. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(c):  Equal Rights Under the Law 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees all Americans “full and equal benefit 
of all laws and proceedings.”90  Originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the mak-
ing and enforcement of private contracts.91 
While on its face, § 1981 might not seem to apply to education, in 
Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme Court held that two black children 
who were denied admission to two private elementary schools on ac-
count of school policies against racial integration92 had a cause of ac-
tion under § 1981.  The students had sought to enter into contractual 
relationships with the schools for educational services, and they had 
been prevented from doing so on account of their race.93 
Rejecting the school’s argument that § 1981 “d[id] not reach pri-
vate acts of racial discrimination,” the Court stressed that parents 
“have no constitutional right to provide their children with private 
school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”94  
Moreover, the court held that the schools did not fall into the “pri-
vate club or other (private) establishment” exemption in Title II of 
the CRA.95  This exemption only applies to truly private clubs.  The 
Court explained that if a private organization comes within the ambit 
of state action, Title II is no longer available.96  However, the Court 
determined that the exemption “d[id] not . . . reach private schools” 
because these schools were “private only in the sense that they [were] 
managed by private persons and they [were] not direct recipients of 
public funds.  Their actual and potential constituency, however, [was] 
 
 89 See e.g. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(c) (2006). 
 90 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 
 91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 n.8 (1976) (dis-
cussing that § 1981 is “derived solely” from § 16 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144). 
 92 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163–65. 
 93 Id. at 164, 172. 
 94 Id. at 173, 178. 
 95 Id. at 172–73 n.10.  Because the private school at issue advertised in the “Yellow Pages” 
and used mass mailings to attract students, the court found that the school’s actual and 
potential constituency is “more public than private” and therefore ineligible for the “pri-
vate club” exemption of Title II of the CRA.  Id. 
 96 Id. at 173 n.10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e). 
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more public than private.”97  Consequently, § 1981 could be applied; 
private schools could not deny admission to prospective students 
based on race. 
2. Tax Statutes 
Six years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of 
eliminating racial discrimination in private education.  In Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked 
tax exempt status for Bob Jones University because of its racially dis-
criminatory policies.98  Claiming that this revocation violated the Uni-
versity’s rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
Bob Jones explained that its ban on interracial dating and admission 
for interracially married students was religiously-motivated and based 
on “a genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and 
marriage.”99  In upholding the IRS policy, the Court explained that 
the government has a “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicat-
ing racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, 
with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s constitu-
tional history.  That . . . interest substantially outweighs whatever bur-
den denial of tax benefits places on [Bob Jones’] exercise of [its] re-
ligious beliefs.”100 
As Runyon and Bob Jones illustrate, the Supreme Court has elimi-
nated purely race-based admissions decisions in both public and pri-
vate education.  The question remains, however:  does government 
have a “fundamental, overriding interest” in eradicating other forms 
of discrimination in education? 
 
 97 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172–73, n.10 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th 
Cir. 1975)). 
 98 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 148–49 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 461 U.S. 
574 (1983).  Believing that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage, Bob Jones 
refused to admit black students until 1971.  Following Runyon, Bob Jones revised its poli-
cy.  From May 1975 until this case in 1983, Bob Jones permitted unmarried blacks to 
enroll, but applicants who engaged in an interracial marriage or were known to advocate 
interracial marriage or dating were categorically denied admission.  See Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580–81 (1983).  After Bob Jones University v. United States was 
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Bob Jones changed its admissions policy to 
admit members of all races.  However, interracial dating continued to be forbidden until 
2000.  See Bob Jones University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, CNN (Mar. 4, 2000), 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/03/04/bob.jones. 
 99 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 602 n.28. 
100 Id. at 604. 
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III.  DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION 
Admissions decisions based on religion have been treated diffe-
rently than admissions decisions based on race.  Section 1981 and 
1982 actions are only available for claims of discrimination based on a 
plaintiff’s race.101  Thus, race-based discrimination is disfavored in 
both the private and public school context.  Public schools are prohi-
bited by the religion clauses from discrimination based on religion.  
Private schools’ religious practice, however, remains constitutionally 
protected.102  Under the First Amendment’s guarantees of free exer-
cise and freedom of association, religious organizations retain the 
right to act on the basis of religious distinctions.103  As a result, the use 
of religion in private school admissions decisions is not parallel to an 
analysis of racially discriminatory admissions or to religious distinc-
tions in public schools. 
The use of religious preferences in private school admissions illu-
strates the different ways that race and religion are treated in consti-
tutional law, especially distinctions between racial and religious cate-
gorizations and public and private actors.  How can the government 
(and, by extension, public schools) refrain from advancing or inhibit-
ing religion while, at the same time, allowing private individuals (and, 
by extension, private schools) to engage in discriminatory classifica-
tions?  While the use of racial classifications in admissions decisions is 
generally impermissible in both public and private schools, the legali-
ty of religion-based admissions policies is not as clear cut.  A school’s 
ability to give preference to members of certain faiths in its admis-
sions policy depends upon the school’s source of funding and the re-
ligious nature of the institution.  While private religious schools may 
be able to exert religious preference in their admissions policies, 
 
101 See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[Sec-
tion] 1982, like § 1981, prohibits only discrimination based on race.”); Selden Apart-
ments v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that prima facie elements of a 
§ 1981 claim include plaintiff being a member of a racial minority); White v. Wash. Pub. 
Power Supply Sys., 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It is well settled that section 
1981 only redresses discrimination based on plaintiff’s race.”); see also Runyon, 427 U.S. at 
167 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is “in no way addressed” to a private school’s ability to 
“limit its student body to . . . adherents of a particular religious faith”). 
102 See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes:  Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 
DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 237 n.314 (2004) (noting that, in contrast to race discrimination, 
private religious practice is constitutionally protected). 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
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public schools may not.104  Thus, the constitutionally required protec-
tion of religious beliefs in the private school context may constitute 
an impermissible establishment of religion in the public school con-
text. 
A. Restrictions on the Use of Religion in Educational Decisions:  Equal 
Protection and the Establishment Clause 
The CRA provides redress for religious discrimination in public 
education.  In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 allows the Attorney 
General to bring a civil action when an individual alleges that she has 
been denied admission to a public school on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and when that action will “materially 
further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public educa-
tion.”105 
In addition—though not specifically related to the admissions 
context—courts have enforced some level of equal protection for re-
ligious groups in schools.  Public schools may not discriminate 
against religious expression by their students.106  Moreover, the Equal 
 
104 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (omitting to prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of religion); see also Office of Gen. Counsel, Summary of Federal Laws, 
Non-Discrimination with Respect to Students, CATHOLIC UNIV. AM., 
http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/Cr1964s.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (“An admissions 
preference on the basis of religion at a private university is not considered a violation of 
any federal law.”). 
105 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006).  “Desegregation” in this context refers to “the assignment 
of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their . . . religion” 
as opposed to “the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial 
imbalance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b).  But see Kenneth L. Marcus, Privileging and Protecting 
Schoolhouse Religion, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 505, 507 n.18 (2008) (claiming that this provision 
provides “little or no benefit, since desegregation is seldom the issue in religious discrim-
ination cases”). 
106 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (the First Amendment “requires the 
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it 
does not require the state to be their adversary.  State power is no more to be used so as 
to handicap religions than it is to favor them”).  See generally Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a school’s exclusion of a Christian children’s 
club from meeting on school property because of religion was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination); Rosenberg v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
(holding unconstitutional a university’s denial of funding to a Christian student group 
while providing funding to other student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981) (holding that a public university that allowed political student-run groups to use 
campus facilities had to provide the same access to a Christian student group); Child 
Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004) (af-
firming injunction against defendant school district that had engaged in unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination when it prevented an evangelical organization from distributing 
flyers at a school event); Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 
1993) (finding that school policy forbidding the distribution of all material with religious 
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Access Act requires public schools to maintain a “limited open fo-
rum” to provide religious student clubs with equal access to meeting 
spaces and school publications.107 
 
B. Defenses to the Use of Religious Preference in Educational Decisions:  Free 
Exercise and Freedom of Association 
Unlike public schools, private schools frequently employ religious 
preferences.  The CRA does not mention private universities but 
§ 2000c-6 tacitly allows for religious preference in admissions at pri-
vate religious universities.108  Thus, an applicant who is rejected from 
a private university because of his or her religious affiliation would 
not have standing to sue under the CRA.  The free exercise of reli-
gion and the freedom to associate protected by the First Amendment 
allow a private educational institution to ask an applicant to identify 
her religion and to grant an admissions preference based on that 
identification.109 
The Free Exercise Clause protects the autonomy of religious 
groups from governmental interference.110  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Wisconsin v. Yoder, “there are areas of conduct protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond 
 
content violated the First Amendment); Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of West-
field, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting high school bible club’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting school from imposing in-school suspensions on bible 
club members and preventing club members from distributing religious literature to oth-
er students); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding 
that a school ban on material that proselytizes a particular religious or political belief was 
unconstitutional discrimination). 
107 The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (2000) (making it unlawful “for any public 
secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open 
forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students 
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of reli-
gious . . . content of the speech at such meetings”); see also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. 
Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the Equal 
Access Act.) 
108 See, e.g., Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28. 
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (omitting religion as a protected class in anti-discrimination law).  
Because § 2000d does not include “religion” as basis for protection against discrimina-
tion, educational institutions have interpreted § 2000d to authorize the exercise of reli-
gious preference in admissions decisions.  See, e.g., Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28. 
110 See Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education toward Religion:  Why 
Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 763 
n.269 (1997) (noting the importance of the Free Exercise Clause in preserving church 
autonomy). 
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the power of the State to control.”111  A law may violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause if it “unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”112 
Though the courts walk a “tight rope” in balancing the Free Exer-
cise Clause and the Establishment Clause, a ban on the use of reli-
gious preferences in admissions decisions would likely unduly burden 
that institution’s exercise of religion.113  A religious school’s decision 
to maintain a distinctive religious creed is at the core of that institu-
tion’s religious exercise.  “Any governmental regulation of a private 
religious school’s curriculum that infringes on . . . school’s expres-
sion [including admissions standards] is presumptively unconstitu-
tional.”114  Consequently, religious schools retain the right to prefer 
members of certain religious groups above other applicants. 
The right to freedom of association reinforces the Free Exercise 
clause.115  An individual’s freedom to worship requires the promise of 
a commensurate freedom to engage in group worship.116  Govern-
ment actions that interfere with the internal organization or affairs of 
a religious group unconstitutionally infringe upon members’ free-
dom to associate.117  Indeed, “[t]here can be no clearer example of an 
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a 
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not de-
sire.”118 
Moreover, government funding of a school that exercises religious 
preferences in admissions does not automatically violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.  In assessing the regulation of funding for private 
religious schools, courts employ two tests.  First, statutes governing 
the funding of religious schools may be struck down under the Agos-
tini test—a modification of the Establishment Clause test developed 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.119  Under this test, courts examine:  1) the ex-
 
111 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
112 Id. 
113 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970). 
114 Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:  
Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 653, 714 (1996). 
115 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (describing the relationship between 
the freedom of association and the Free Exercise Clause). 
116 Id. at 622. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 623. 
119 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  Under the Lemon Test, to be found 
constitutional, “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; final-
ly, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”  Id. 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court modified the test in 
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tent to which a statute has a secular purpose; and 2) whether the sta-
tute has the primary effect of advancing religion.120  Second, some 
courts still employ the “pervasively sectarian” test.  Under this test, 
courts determine whether the school is “so ‘pervasively sectarian’ that 
secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones.”121 
While statutes are occasionally struck down under the Agostini 
test,122 schools are rarely found to be so sectarian as to compromise 
government funding.123  Furthermore, in a series of cases against Co-
lumbia Union College (CUC), the Fourth Circuit held that an admis-
sion preference alone would not amount to a finding that a college 
was pervasively sectarian and thus ineligible for public funding.124  
Consequently, a private religious school’s ability to employ religious 
preference in admissions decisions is not likely to threaten federal 
funding under the Establishment Clause. 
IV.  WHEN RACE AND RELIGION OVERLAP:  ETHNORELIGIOUS GROUPS 
As Parts II and III demonstrate, courts evaluate race-based and re-
ligion-based admissions preferences differently.  How, then, are 
courts to assess admissions discrimination when race and religion are 
mixed in a single applicant or group of applicants?  That is, how are 
 
Agostini v. Felton, subsuming the “excessive entanglement” prong into an examination of 
the statute’s effect.  521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997). 
120 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844–45 (2000) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that to determine a statute’s validity under the Establishment Clause, 
courts examine whether a statute:  1) has a secular purpose and 2) has a primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion). 
121 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).  Note, however, that the viability 
of the pervasively sectarian test is debatable.  See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826–29 (Thomas, J., 
plurality) (suggesting that the pervasively sectarian test should be abandoned); James A. 
Davids, Pounding a Final Stake in the Heart of the Invidiously Discriminatory “Pervasively Secta-
rian” Test, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 59, 93–104 (2008) (describing circuit courts’ confusion 
regarding the vitality of the pervasively sectarian test post-Mitchell). 
122 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
123 See, e.g., Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 163 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court has set the bar to finding an institution of higher learning pervasively secta-
rian quite high.”); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826–29 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality) (sug-
gesting that the “pervasively sectarian” standard should be dismissed entirely.) 
124 Columbia Union Coll., 159 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he college must in fact possess a great many of 
the following characteristics:  mandatory student worship services; an express preference 
in hiring and admissions for members of the affiliated church for the purpose of deepen-
ing the religious experience or furthering religious indoctrination; academic courses im-
plemented with the primary goal of religious indoctrination; and church dominance over 
college affairs as illustrated by its control over the board of trustees and financial expend-
itures.”). 
248 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
courts to evaluate discrimination targeted at a member of an ethnore-
ligious group?125 
Members of ethnoreligious groups exhibit both religious and eth-
nic concerns.126  Many groups have been labeled as “ethnoreligious” 
including Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims in China, Turkish Mus-
lims in Europe, Greek Orthodox, and Italian Catholics in the United 
States.127  This Comment, however, focuses on Jews.  Jews are a prime 
example of an ethnoreligious group:  while Jews may embrace a dis-
tinct religious identity, Jews may also be grouped together in national 
or ethnic terms.128  As sociologist J. Alan Winter wrote, “while primari-
ly differentiated by their religious beliefs and practices, Jews are diffe-
rentiated as well . . . by a sense of peoplehood.”129 
A. A Historical Understanding of Judaism:  Race or Religion? 
Determining whether Judaism is a religion or a race is no easy 
task.  Some scholars maintain that Judaism fits into neither of those 
categories.130  While some argue that Judaism denotes a religion with 
normative beliefs and practices, others claim that Jews who practice 
Judaism are members of the ethnic group, the Jews.131  However, an 
individual of Jewish heritage who declares herself to be an atheist 
may still be considered a Jew by other Jews.132 
 
125 See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom:  
The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 45 n.18 (2002) 
(“[E]thnoreligious groups are comprised of members bound together by loyalty to com-
mon ethnic origins, prominently including religious identity, but interwoven with lan-
guage, physical (or ‘racial’) characteristics etc.”); see also Hinkle, supra note 30, at 169–73 
(explaining how religion and race are often confused in jury selection). 
126 J. Alan Winter, The Transformation of Community Integration among American Jewry:  Religion 
or Ethnoreligion?  A National Replication, 33 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 349, 350 (1992) (defining 
ethnoreligious groups). 
127 Danchin, supra note 125, at 44 n.18 (2002) (listing different ethnoreligious groups.) 
128 Winter, supra note 126, at 350 (1992) (describing different facets of Jewish identity). 
129 Id. at 351. 
130 For example, Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz writes that Judaism is neither a religion, a race or na-
tion, or an ethnic group.  Instead, he claims that Jews are “essentially and principally” a 
family.  Stensaltz claims that someone who removes himself from the Jewish “family” and 
converts to another religion is still a Jew because of his genetic ties.  Under this frame-
work, Judaism becomes an immutable characteristic and points more towards the idea of 
Judaism as race.  See ADIN STEINSALTZ, WE JEWS:  WHO ARE WE AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO? 
42–55 (Yehuda Hanegbi & Rebecca Toueg trans., 2005). 
131 See Jacob Neusner, Jew and Judaist, Ethnic and Religious:  How They Mix in America, in 
RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 85, 85 (Craig R. Prentiss ed., 2003); 
see also ASHLEY MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 52–57 (3d ed. 1972) (arguing that Jews 
are not a race but rather a religious and cultural group). 
132 STEINSALTZ, supra note 130, at 53–55 (writing “a person cannot leave or be ejected from 
the Jewish family”); Neusner, supra note 131, at 88. 
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Genetic characteristics are often traced to Jewish ancestry.133  This 
suggests that Judaism is an immutable status similar to race.  By con-
verting to Judaism, however, a gentile—a person without ethnic or 
racial Jewish heritage—becomes a Jew.134  This points towards a con-
ception of Judaism as a changeable identity that can be adopted at 
will, a religion.  Thus, Judaism straddles race and religion, depending 
on where the emphasis lies. 
Notably, while Americans at one time embraced a notion of Ju-
daism as race, that understanding gradually faded.135  In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, a conception of Judaism as a 
“race” allowed Jews to express an attachment to “Jewishness” as assi-
milation to American culture began to tear down cultural boundaries 
between minority groups.136  As Americans became concerned with 
the rise of immigrant labor taking away industrial jobs from native-
born whites at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, many 
Jews struggled with the tension between accepting the benefits of 
identifying more strongly with the “Caucasian family” and their desire 
to preserve a more distinct racial identity.137 
World War II further extinguished the notion of Judaism as race.  
As part of their justification for the Holocaust, Nazis labeled Jews an 
inferior race.138  Promoting eugenics and “race hygiene,” Nazis “med-
icalized anti-Semitism to lend legitimacy to the genocide.”139  As one 
result of this Nazi conception of Judaism as a race, Jewish writers of 
the 1940s and 50s began to move away from a racial definition of Jews 
and towards an understanding of Judaism based on shared religion 
 
133 Jonathan Weems, A Proposal for a Federal Genetic Privacy Act, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 116 
(2003) (noting the genetic link between Tay-Sachs disease and Ashkenazi Jews); Wade, 
supra note 31 (reciting recent genetic studies finding Jews to be genetically related); see 
also Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 
392 n.134 (2009) (describing genetic patterns common among Jews). 
134 STEINSALTZ, supra note 130, at 53–55.  Jewish denominations are partially differentiated 
based on their respective conversion processes.  The legitimacy of M’s mother’s Progres-
sive Jewish conversion in the eyes of the Orthodox JFS was the central issue in JFS.  See R 
(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [17], [22] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
135 See generally Eric L. Goldstein, Contesting the Categories:  Jews and Government Racial Classifica-
tion in the United States, 19 JEWISH HIST. 79 (2005) (discussing the history of American 
conceptions of Judaism as a “race”). 
136 Id. at 81. 
137 Id. at 83–84. 
138 See Nazi Racism, U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/ 
en/article.php?ModuleId=10007679 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); see also Joseph Avanzato, 
Section 1982 and Discrimination against Jews:  Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 37 AM. 
U. L. REV. 225, 228 n.13 (1987) (substantiating the claim that Nazi persecution of Jews 
was racially motivated).  See generally ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1924). 
139 NAOMI BAUMSLAG, MURDEROUS MEDICINE:  NAZI DOCTORS, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, 
AND TYPHUS 37 (2005). 
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and culture.140  For some, the idea of a Jewish race condones Nazi 
propaganda. 
Americans’ rejection of the idea of Judaism as a race was explored 
publicly in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb141 in 1987.  Shaare Tefila 
addressed the question of whether painting anti-Semitic slogans, 
phrases, and symbols on a synagogue violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982.142  
The lawsuit highlighted Jews’ reluctance to accept a racialized identi-
ty.143  The National Jewish Community Relations Council asserted that 
“there ought not to be the suggestion that the Jewish community in 
any way gives sanction to the notion that Jews constitute a race.”144  
The American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of 
B’nai B’rith eventually submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of pro-
viding Jews with protection from “racial discrimination,” but neither 
of these organizations “believed that the Jews actually constituted a 
‘race’ . . . . Ultimately, they were willing to accept the terminology of 
‘race’ because it was the only language available in American law that 
could bring Jews under the umbrella of civil rights protection.”145 
 
140 Susan A. Glenn, In the Blood?  Consent, Descent, and the Ironies of Jewish Identity, 8 JEWISH 
SOC. STUD. 145, 146 (2002).  Glenn cites several literary examples of ways in which the 
idea of a Jewish racial identity declined in the wake of World War II.  For example, in the 
Academy Award-winning film, Gentleman’s Agreement (1947), a Jewish physicist character 
“challenges the idea that being a Jew is a matter of racial descent.”  Id.  The character 
states, “‘I have no religion, so I am not Jewish by religion.  Further, I am a scientist, so I 
must rely on science which tells me I am not Jewish by race, since there’s no such thing as 
a distinct Jewish race.’”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, Glenn explains 
that editors of the 1955 volume Who’s Who in World Jewry:  A Biographical Dictionary of Out-
standing Jews determined that “the principle [of] ‘Jewish birth’ would not determine the 
selection process [for the volume].  Instead, the list [of individuals included] . . . would 
be based on the modern concept of ‘self-identification as a Jew’ as evidenced by ‘partici-
pation in some phase of Jewish life.’”  Id. at 147. 
141 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). 
142 Id. at 616 (“Section 1982 guarantees all citizens of the United States, ‘the same 
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property.’  The section also forbids both official and private racially 
discriminatory interference with property rights . . . .” (alteration in original) (citing 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968))). 
143 See, e.g., Naomi W. Cohen, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb:  A New Departure in Ameri-
can Jewish Defense? 3 JEWISH HIST. 95, 100–02 (1988) (explaining various national Jewish 
organizations’ reluctance to agree to categorize Judaism as a race). 
144 Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145 Goldstein, supra note 134, at 99. 
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B. A Legal Understanding of Judaism:  Jews and Race 
Even the identification of Jews is difficult.  “Who is a Jew?” wrote 
Justice James Munby in JFS; “as will . . . become apparent, that is not a 
matter on which all . . . agree.”146 
In the United States, numerous cases suggested that Jews should 
be legally treated as a race.147  A pair of Supreme Court cases in 1987 
solidified the idea of Jews as a race as binding law. 
First, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court held that a 
Caucasian Arab could sustain a claim of racial discrimination under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981.148  In Saint Francis, an Iraqi-born United States citi-
zen was hired as a professor.149  The professor alleged that he had 
been denied tenure because of his “Arabian” race and sued under 
§ 1981.150  The college argued that § 1981 did not encompass claims 
of discrimination by one Caucasian against another.151  Noting that 
§ 1981 had its source in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,152 the Court con-
cluded that at the time of its passage, Arabs were not considered to 
be the same race as Englishmen, Germans, and other Caucasians.153  
Thus, the Court wrote, “we have little trouble in concluding that 
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes 
of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely be-
cause of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics” regardless of “wheth-
er or not [they] would be classified as racial in terms of modern 
scientific theory.”154  Although Saint Francis did not explicitly mention 
whether § 1981 would apply to Jews, by interpreting § 1981 to protect 
all groups of people considered to be distinct racial groups at the 
 
146 R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536 (Admin), [6] (Eng.). 
147 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(describing treatment of the “Jewish race” in Germany); Banker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579 
F. Supp 1183, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (arguing that Nazi anti-Semitism was motivated by rac-
ism); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 567 & n.25 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (noting that 
Jews are the target of “racial prejudice”); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, No. 35206, 1972 WL 
197, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 1972) (arguing that prejudice against Jews has become ra-
cial); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Be-
cause Jewish culture, ancestry, and ethnic identity are intricately bounds up with Judaic 
religious beliefs, racial and religious discrimination against Jews cannot be . . . easily dis-
tinguished . . . .”). 
148 Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
149 Id. at 606. 
150 Id. at 606, 609 (“Although § 1981 does not itself use the word ‘race,’ the court has con-
strued the section to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination in the making of private as well as 
public contracts.” (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174–75 (1976))). 
151 Id. at 609–10. 
152 Id. 610–12. 
153 Id. at 612. 
154 Id. at 613. 
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passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the case laid the groundwork 
for Jews to claim discrimination under § 1981. 
The Court officially asserted § 1981’s applicability to Jews in Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, finding that the term “race” within the 
meaning of the 1866 Act was not limited by contemporary usage of 
the term.155  In Shaare Tefila, petitioners claimed that they had been 
deprived of the right to hold property in violation of § 1982 because 
the defendants’ desecration of their synagogue was motivated by “ra-
cial prejudice.”156  Defendants claimed that because Jews were not 
members of a “racially distinct group,” petitioners could not state a 
claim for racial discrimination under § 1982.157  Thus the question be-
fore the Court boiled down to whether Jews could be considered a 
race for purposes of § 1982 protections:  were Jews the “kind of group 
that Congress intended to protect” when it passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.158  Adopting Saint Francis’ interpretation of congressional in-
tent, the Court determined that Jews were among the peoples consi-
dered to be a distinct race within the protection of the 1866 Act.159  As 
a result, the Jewish petitioners could maintain a § 1982 action. 
Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila jointly established that Jews are le-
gally considered to be a race for civil rights actions.160  In the wake of 
the two decisions, protection of Jews as a “race” was extended to allow 
Jews to maintain § 1981 actions and cases under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.161  In addition, Jews may be able to receive protection 
under Title VI against racial discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams or activities.162 
 
155 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987). 
156 Id. at 616. 
157 Brief for Respondent at 5, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (No. 
85-2156). 
158 Id. at 617. 
159 Id. at 617–18. 
160 See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism:  A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1730 
n.110 (2000) (noting that Shaare Tefila applied Saint Francis’ reasoning). 
161 See U.S. v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Jews . . . are today generally not 
considered a distinct race. . . . [However], the Supreme Court’s case law firmly and clearly 
rules that Jews count as a ‘race’ under certain civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment. . . . [T]hese cases not only extend 
the protections of Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes, now codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1982, to Jews understood as a ‘race,’ they also implicitly rule that the Thir-
teenth Amendment . . . protects Jews as a race.”) (citations omitted). 
162 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d) (2000).  Jews’ ability to receive 
Title VI protections remains in flux.  In 2004, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued a 
formal “Dear Colleague” letter informing recipient institutions that it would exercise its 
Title VI jurisdiction to defend Jews.  The OCR also issued a guidance letter explaining 
that “‘Jewish’ may be interpreted as an ethnic [or] . . . racial category.”  Kenneth L. Mar-
cus, supra note 132, at 387–88; see Memorandum from Kenneth L. Marcus, Deputy Assis-
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Since Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila, lower courts have been reluc-
tant to differentiate between religious and racial discrimination 
against Jews.  This has resulted in at least two rulings that extend the 
1866 Act to purely religious discrimination against Jews.163  In LeBlanc-
Sternberg v. Fletcher, a Hasidic Rabbi sued those responsible for incor-
poration of the village of Airmont, New York, alleging that Airmont 
had been incorporated in order to prevent the development of Or-
thodox Jewish residential neighborhoods.164  The rabbi claimed that 
the defendants had violated the Hasidim’s right to use and enjoy 
property under § 1982.165  Defendants, however, asserted that their 
motivation was purely religious, being “directed toward the plaintiffs’ 
lifestyle as dictated by the tenets of plaintiffs’ religion.”166  While the 
federal district judge acknowledged that the defendants’ actions were 
based on the plaintiff’s religion, he said that this “ma[de] . . . no dif-
ference . . . . Because Jewish culture, ancestry, and ethnic identity are 
intricately bound up with Judaic religious beliefs, racial and religious 
discrimination against Jews cannot be as easily distinguished as de-
fendants would have it . . . . We need not inquire any further.”167  Re-
jecting an examination of the nature of the anti-Semitism, the judge 
held that the Jewish plaintiffs had stated claims for racial discrimina-
tion under §§ 1981 and 1982.168 
A second judge also overlooked claimed distinctions between reli-
gious and racial discrimination in Singer v. Denver School District No. 
1.169  In that case, a Hispanic public school teacher who converted to 
Orthodox Judaism claimed that he had experienced discrimination 
 
tant Sec’y for Enforcement, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Sept. 13, 2004), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html; Letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Deputy Assis-
tant Sec’y for Enforcement, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Sidney 
Groeneman, Senior Research Assoc., Inst. for Jewish & Cmty. Research 1–2 (Oct. 22, 
2004), available at http://www.eusccr.com/letterforcampus.pdf.  In 2006, however, Ho-
norable Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights, stated that 
the OCR will not investigate allegations of anti-Semitic harassment unless the allegations 
also include other forms of discrimination over which OCR has subject matter jurisdic-
tion.  See Letter from Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., 
to Kenneth L. Marcus, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 1 (Dec. 4, 2006), available 
at http://www.eusccr.com/lettermonroe.pdf. 
163 See Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Colo. 1997); LeBlanc-
Sternberg v. Fletcher 781 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
164 LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F.Supp at 264. 
165 Id. at 267. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 267–68. 
168 Id. 
169 Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Colo. 1997). 
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on account of his race and his religion.170  Because Singer was a con-
vert without any Jewish ancestry or heritage, it would seem that any 
discrimination faced by Singer would not be racial anti-Semitism, but 
rather discrimination based on his Jewish religious practices—
religious anti-Semitism.171  Singer himself described the discrimina-
tion as religious, accusing his employer of “religious harassment.”172  
Surprisingly, however, the court rejected the argument that Singer’s 
claims were purely religious:  “[s]ince Singer is claiming he was dis-
criminated against as a Jew, a distinct racial group for the purposes of 
§ 1981, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the basis that he 
is claiming religious discrimination.”173  Singer suggests that even if 
Jews are subject to purely religious classification, they will still have 
access to racial protections. 
LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer demonstrate that courts will be reluc-
tant to differentiate between religious and racial discrimination, at 
least in the case of discrimination against Jews.  In a sense, this pro-
vides Jews with a greater level of protection than other non-racial, re-
ligious minority groups.174  For example, if a Mormon—a member of 
a non-racial, religious minority group—was fired as a result of his 
Mormon religious observance, he could not claim he had been dis-
criminated against as a result of his race in violation of § 1981.  In 
contrast, a Jew who was fired solely as a result of his Jewish religious 
practice could allege racial discrimination under § 1981.  Thus, while 
claims of religious discrimination are not actionable under §§ 1981 
and 1982, Jews—because of their unique racial and religious status—
may use these statutes to mount claims of religious discrimination by 
claiming that they were discriminated against on the basis of their sta-
tus as Jews. 
V.  A PROPOSAL FOR GREATER JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO ANTI-SEMITISM 
Anti-Semitism presents courts with two conflicting interests:  an 
interest in preserving the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious 
 
170 Id. at 1326–28. 
171 William Kaplowitz, We Need Inquire Further:  Normative Stereotypes, Hasidic Jews, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 537, 555 (2007) (analyzing the discrimination 
against Singer). 
172 Singer, 959 F. Supp at 1328. 
173 Id. at 1331. 
174 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (explaining that § 1981 does not 
apply to religious discrimination); Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d. 1163, 1167 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“It is well established, however, that § 1981 does not apply to claims of religious 
discrimination.”). 
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schools’ right to religious preference and an interest in preserving 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against impermissible ra-
cial discrimination.  To better balance these conflicting interests, 
courts should be more willing to examine the nature of the discrimi-
nation.  Discrimination related to immutable characteristics of ance-
stry should remain subject to traditional race-based protections while 
discrimination relating to religious beliefs and practice should re-
ceive only those protections available to religious discrimination. 
Greater judicial inquiry into the nature of the anti-Semitism at is-
sue would be valuable for two reasons.  First, by distinguishing be-
tween racial and religious anti-Semitism, courts could ensure that all 
victims of religious discrimination are treated similarly and that all 
victims of racial discrimination are treated similarly.  Otherwise, Jews 
are essentially afforded a unique legal status that undermines basic 
fairness.  Second, by examining the nature of the discrimination 
against Jews, courts can preserve religious schools’ constitutionally 
protected right to express religious preferences.  While a closer ex-
amination of anti-Semitism might require increased expenditure of 
judicial resources, because of the small number of cases in this area 
and judicial flexibility in choosing how to protect victims of discrimi-
nation, the benefit to maintaining clear boundaries between religious 
and racial animus outweighs concerns regarding judicial economy. 
A. Ensuring Similar Treatment 
In the interests of consistency and fairness, courts should examine 
anti-Jewish discrimination to ensure that all victims of religious and 
racial discrimination are treated similarly.  By allowing Jews to bring 
race-based claims and refusing to inquire into the nature of the dis-
crimination (racial or religious) against Jews, courts effectively pro-
vide Jews with a unique level of protection from discrimination.  Case 
law suggests that anyone identifying as Jewish—independent of their 
ancestry or manner of conversion—may invoke race-based protec-
tions against discrimination.175  Because laws governing the use of 
race and the use of religion in admissions decisions differ,176 this 
access to race-based protections effectively ensures that any discrimi-
nation against Jews in admissions decisions is race-based and imper-
missible. 
By providing Jews with race-based protections, courts give Jews 
greater protection than other victims of religious discrimination.  
 
175 See, e.g., Singer, 959 F. Supp. at 1331. 
176 See infra Parts II-III. 
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This kind of disparate treatment belies the fairness that forms the ba-
sis of the American legal system because courts have differentiated 
between religious and racial discrimination when dealing with other 
groups.177  This kind of disparate treatment could also trigger in-
creased anti-Semitism based on resentment of Jews’ unique receipt of 
race-based protections.178 
One could argue that courts have a greater interest in protecting 
Jews than some other minority groups because of America’s legacy of 
anti-Semitism.179  Perhaps Jews, like African-Americans, deserve in-
creased judicial protections as a result of “the tragic and indelible fact 
that discrimination . . . has pervaded our Nation’s history and con-
tinues to scar our society.”180 
The potential for backlash argues against an automatic provision 
of racial antidiscrimination protections for Jews, however.  Allowing 
Jewish victims of religious discrimination to assert race-based discrim-
ination claims could trigger “backlash against ‘special rights’ and 
‘special treatment’” afforded to Jewish victims of religious discrimina-
tion, leading to a fortification of anti-Semitic animus.181  As one scho-
lar noted in his evaluation of antidiscrimination laws in the 
workplace, “[h]ostility to antidiscrimination laws creates real hurdles 
to their enforcement.”182 
In the context of affirmative action programs, for example, efforts 
seen as providing racial minorities with “special rights” have triggered 
backlash from the racial majority.  Over one-quarter of Americans 
(28%) believe that too much attention has been paid to problems 
 
177 See, e.g., Daud v. Gold’n Plump Poultry, Inc., No. 06-4013, 2007 WL 1621386, at *9 (D. 
Minn., May 11, 2007) (evaluating Somali Muslims’ complaints of racial and religious dis-
crimination and determining that they stated only allegations of religious discrimina-
tion). 
178 See generally Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights:  “Special” Rights and the Politics of 
Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 723 (2005) (asserting that the 
perception that certain minorities have received “special rights” treatment has triggered 
resentment and motivated opposition). 
179 See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Getting In, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2005 (describing strategies 
employed by American colleges in the early twentieth century to keep Jews out); The Jew-
ish Law Student and New York Jobs:  Discriminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring Practice, 73 YALE 
L.J. 625, 635 (1964) (describing law firm interview techniques perceived to be intended 
to exclude Jews). 
180 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that affirmative action programs may be necessary to remedy past discrimina-
tion). 
181 Clark Freshman, Prevention Perspectives on “Different” Kinds of Discrimination:  From Attacking 
Different “Isms” to Promoting Acceptance in Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empiri-
cal Research, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2293, 2318 (2003). 
182 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination:  Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 140 
(2008). 
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facing African-Americans;183 a sentiment which threatens to exacer-
bate tangible racial divisions in America.  In fact, Professor Clark 
Freshman has suggested that the perception that certain minority 
groups are receiving “special treatment” may result in “explicit re-
trenchment” of race stereotypes.184  On a macrolevel, this may result 
in “initiatives . . . to prohibit race-conscious programs in schools and 
universities, court decisions invalidating affirmative action, or legisla-
tion.”185  Backlash may also occur “on a microlevel when outsiders 
cannot break into organizations or through glass ceilings, or when 
fellow employees sabotage their work.”186 
Professor Freshman’s analysis of majority backlash against the 
“special treatment” of racial minorities suggests that courts’ unique 
treatment of Jews could result in increased cultural divisions.  Ironi-
cally, providing Jews with unique legal treatment has the potential to 
increase anti-Semitism and impede the enforcement of civil rights 
law. 
B.  Preserving Religious Preference 
Providing Jews with the blanket anti-discrimination protections 
given to minority racial groups also undermines private actors’ right 
to religious preference.  The Free Exercise Clause and the right to 
Freedom of Association ensure that a Catholic school may admit 
Catholic applicants ahead of others.187  Preferring Catholic applicants 
over Jews, however, might not be protected.  Instead, because case 
law defines Jews as a race, admitting Catholic applicants while deny-
ing equally qualified Jews would constitute impermissible racial dis-
crimination.  This is true even if a Catholic school’s admissions policy 
is based on purely religious preference, e.g., the school holds manda-
tory activities on Friday evenings or Saturday mornings and believes 
that admitting Sabbath-observing Jews would inhibit these activities.  
If Jews are treated as a race, the Catholic school no longer has the 
constitutional right to reject Jewish applicants. 
 
183 The Tea Party Movement:  What They Think, CBS NEWS (April 14, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20002529-503544.html?tag=contentMain;
contentBody. 
184 Freshman, supra note 181, at 2318. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 2318–19. 
187 See Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28 (characterizing a private religious educational 
institution’s right to admit members of certain faiths above others as “part of the First 
Amendment free exercise right of the religious educational institution”). 
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Similarly, a Jewish school could not discriminate against Jewish 
applicants.  An admissions policy like the one at issue in JFS would be 
struck down as unconstitutional.  Under American law, as in Britain, 
if a Jewish-American student were rejected by a Jewish school because 
of his mother’s ancestry, he or she could state a § 1981 claim for ra-
cial discrimination.188  A number of Jewish schools, however, continue 
to ask questions related to the ancestry of the applicant.189  For exam-
ple, the Ida Crown Jewish Academy in Chicago, Illinois, asks appli-
cants whether their mother and maternal grandmother are “Jewish by 
birth.”190  If the applicant, applicant’s mother, or applicant’s maternal 
grandmother is “not Jewish by birth,” applicants must “provide [a] 
certificate of Halachic conversion.”191  A Jewish school such as Ida 
Crown might try to distinguish itself from a Catholic school that has 
rejected Jewish applicants on account of their Jewishness by arguing 
that it is merely “policing its own,” a case of Jews discriminating 
against other Jews.  However, because racial discrimination between 
members of the same race is also actionable under § 1981, discrimi-
nation against one sect of Judaism by another would still be racial 
discrimination.192 
A more difficult question is whether a Jewish school could per-
missibly reject an applicant on account of his religious practice.  This 
could occur, for example, if an Orthodox school rejected a “Jewish by 
birth” applicant because he was not sufficiently observant.  On the 
one hand, this kind of religious discrimination between Jews may 
constitute a constitutional exercise of a Jewish school’s religious free-
doms, analogous to a Catholic school’s ability to preference a Catho-
lic applicant over a Protestant applicant.  On the other hand, howev-
er, if courts, following LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer, refuse to analyze 
the nature of the school’s admissions decision, a Jewish applicant who 
is rejected by a Jewish school because of his religious practice should 
 
188 Presuming that the student could show that he had been rejected because of his Jewish an-
cestry. 
189 See, e.g., Application for Admission, MAIMONIDES SCHOOL, http://www.maimonides.org/ 
pdf/admissions/Application_GrK-1.pdf (“If your child, either parent, or any grandparent 
has been converted, please indicate the name of the Rabbi and Beit Din who performed 
the conversion.  Please enclose a copy of the certificate of conversion.”); Ramaz Lower 
School Application, RAMAZ LOWER SCH., http://www.ramaz.org/public/ 
LowerSchoolApplication.pdf (asking both applicant’s mother and father to check a box 
entitled “Jewish by Birth” or “Jewish by Conversion”). 
190 Application for Admission, IDA CROWN JEWISH ACAD., http://www.icja.org/filebin/ 
ICJAApplication0809.pdf. 
191 Id. 
192 Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There can . . . be ‘racial’ discrim-
ination within the same race . . . .”). 
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be able to state a § 1981 claim for racial discrimination.  Thus, the 
constitutionality of a Jewish school’s ability to prefer applicants on ac-
count of their level of religious observance—the extent to which LeB-
lanc-Sternberg and Singer may be applied to religious discrimination be-
tween Jews—remains an open question. 
C. Justifying Greater Judicial Inquiry 
Closer judicial examination of anti-Semitic discrimination would 
maintain clearer boundaries between claims of purely religious dis-
crimination and those of racial discrimination.  In the Singer case, for 
example, instead of dismissing the defendants’ claims that their dis-
crimination was religion-based, the court could have examined the 
record more closely.  Defendants made discriminating remarks about 
Singer’s religious clothing, dietary restrictions, and religious prac-
tice.193  Yet their comments were not based on Singer’s ancestry or any 
other unchangeable characteristic; Singer was ethnically Hispanic.  
Thus, Singer should not have been allowed to claim race-based dis-
crimination.  He should have brought a Title VII claim for religion-
based discrimination in employment. 
1. Response to Concerns of Judicial Economy 
While there are valid concerns that a greater inquiry into whether 
anti-Semitism is religious or racial would tax judicial resources and 
cause congestion in the courts, this concern should not be exagge-
rated.  Because only a small number of cases involve a need to distin-
guish between religious and racial discrimination, these fears are 
largely unfounded.  The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported 
1,211 anti-Semitic incidents in the United States for 2009.194  In 2008, 
approximately 2% of federal civil cases went to trial.195  Assuming ar-
guendo that victims of all of these incidents brought civil discrimina-
tion suits—as opposed to criminal actions—then judges would be 
called upon to adjudicate about twenty-four cases where the line be-
tween religious and racial discrimination could be an issue.  Moreo-
ver, it seems likely that some of those twenty-four cases would be de-
termined on procedural questions.  With less than twenty-four of the 
 
193 Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325, 1327–28 (1997). 
194 ADL Audit:  1,211 Anti-Semitic Incidents across the Country in 2009, ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE (July 27, 2010), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS_12/5814_12.htm. 
195 UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS app. D, tbl. C-4 (2009), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/C04Mar09.pdf. 
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260,000 case filings that federal trial courts receive annually196 possibly 
requiring some in-depth analysis of discrimination, concerns about 
judicial economy remain unwarranted. 
2. Response to Concerns of Judicial Expertise 
Opponents of a greater examination of anti-Semitism may also ar-
gue that judges are not well-equipped to engage in such analyses of 
discrimination.197  There are at least two responses:  first, judges are 
often called upon to explore areas where they have “little or no ex-
pertise.”198  Indeed, “[j]udges are hired to be thoughtful legal analysts 
and diligent factual analysts,” and should not “shy away from analyz-
ing subjects they do not know in advance” of trial.199  Second, courts 
currently allow a greater number of overly protective judgments.  In 
deeming all anti-Semitic discrimination “racial,” courts mistakenly 
conclude that all anti-Semitism is in fact racial.200 
There may be occasions when the inquiry into the nature of anti-
Semitism does not yield a clear answer.  This could occur, for exam-
ple, where an individual faced both religious and racial discrimina-
tion on account of her Judaism.  In those cases, it may be appropriate 
for a court to defer to race-based protections for fear of condoning 
racial animus.  By drawing clear boundaries between religious and ra-
cial anti-Semitism, however, courts can preserve well-established dif-
ferences in law between religious discrimination and racial discrimi-
nation and ensure more uniform application of antidiscrimination 
laws to all victims.  In addition, deeper probing into discrimination 
would preserve religious organizations’ First Amendment rights.  A 
Catholic school’s religious preference would be examined to deter-
mine whether the admissions decision was motivated by religious be-
 
196 Id. at app. D, tbl. C. 
197 See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench:  A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 185, 197–98 (2007) (explaining that some scholars object to the idea of 
courts engaging with substantive analysis); Hon. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737–38 (2006) (criticizing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court for failing to “defer to the judgment of those elected to represent the people”).  
But see Christina Bateup, The Dialogic Promise:  Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (2006) (“Other [scholars] suggest 
that a more substantive approach to interpretation is required so that judges can address 
the fundamental moral values that are embodied in the Constitution.”). 
198 Courtney T. Nguyen, Note, Employment Discrimination and the Evidentiary Standard for Estab-
lishing Pretext:  Weinstock v. Columbia University, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1305, 1342–43 
(2002). 
199 Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding:  When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too 
Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 566 (2009). 
200 See supra Part V.A. 
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lief or racial characteristics.  If the Catholic school’s admissions policy 
gave preference to non-Jews because admitting Sabbath-observing 
Jews would inhibit mandatory Saturday activities, this would be dis-
crimination based purely on Jewish religious practice.  As a result, the 
admissions policy would be a valid constitutional expression of the 
school’s religious belief.  In contrast, if the Catholic school’s discri-
minatory admissions policy were based on an explicit belief that ad-
mitting Jewish applicants would change the religious makeup of the 
student body, this kind of discrimination would be analyzed as im-
permissible race-based discrimination. 
Similarly, if a Jewish school gave admissions preferences to appli-
cants whose mothers were “Jewish by birth,” this practice would be 
struck down as an illegal racial classification.  If, however, the Jewish 
school evaluated applicants based on their level of observance—for 
example, their involvement in synagogue and their commemoration 
of Jewish holidays—that might be a permissible religious distinction. 
As these examples illustrate, investigating the nature of anti-
Semitism could be particularly important in religious school admis-
sions where the constitutionality of an admissions decision might de-
pend upon the nature of the discrimination.  Although beyond the 
scope of this paper, other private institutions expressing religious 
preferences such as nursing homes201 and private cemeteries202 could 
be similarly affected by the courts’ unique treatment of anti-Semitism. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Courts and legislatures have long distinguished between racial 
and religious discrimination.  While racial classifications are almost 
always disfavored, religious classifications may be permissible.  In 
public education, both racial and religious discrimination are prohi-
bited.  In private education, racial discrimination remains prohibited 
but religious discrimination is permitted.  Consequently, in the pri-
vate school context, courts struggle with cases involving discrimina-
tion against groups embodying both racial and religious characteris-
tics. 
 
201 The Federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in senior housing on the basis of 
race.  Fair Housing Act § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).  However, the Act allows religious 
organizations to prefer applicants for housing on the basis of religion.  42 U.S.C. § 
3607(a).  For additional discussion, see generally Michael P. Seng, The Fair Housing Act 
and Religious Freedom, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2005). 
202 See Note, The Cemetery Lot:  Rights and Restrictions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 393 (1961) (not-
ing that religious discrimination in cemeteries is arguably protected by the First Amend-
ment.) 
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The British JFS case exemplifies courts’ difficulties when con-
fronted with discrimination against ethnoreligious groups:  if Judaism 
is a religion, a private religious school may validly prefer certain Jew-
ish sects above others; if Jews are a race, however, admitting members 
of one sect of Judaism over others constitutes impermissible racial 
discrimination.  Not wanting to inquire into the nature of discrimina-
tion against Jews, U.S. courts have rejected even the prospect of sepa-
rating racial and religious discrimination.  Instead, they provide Jews 
with race-based protections as a matter of course. 
These unique protections for Jews do not seem to be intentionally 
preferential.  Instead, courts are unsure how to deal with ethnoreli-
gious groups.  By providing Jewish litigants with heightened racial 
protections, however, courts may unintentionally encourage backlash 
against these minorities.  Moreover, by providing Jews with unique 
legal status, courts may prevent private schools from exercising oth-
erwise constitutionally protected religious preferences. 
The tension between the government’s interest in preventing dis-
crimination and its interest in preserving religious freedom is ongo-
ing.  Although Jews pose a unique challenge to this balancing 
scheme, to the extent possible courts should attempt to delineate be-
tween religious and racial discrimination.  By differentiating between 
discrimination on the basis of ancestry and discrimination on the ba-
sis of religious belief and practice, courts may better prevent invi-
dious racial discrimination while at the same time preserving the 
freedom of religious preference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
